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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

)
)

Case No. 14030

)

CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION; OSCAR A. ROBIN; and
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

)

)

.

)

DEFENDANT, UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This respondent agrees with appellant's statement set
forth in its brief.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all defendants and respondents, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and respondent, Utah State Road Commission seeks
an affirmance of the trial court's determination that said respondent is not liable to appellant and that its option agreement with Ogden City was valid and binding and entitled appellant to remove a "reasonable" amount of material and that respondent, Utah State Road Commission, did not act improperly
in obtaining the option agreement from Ogden City.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, Utah State Road Commission, essentially
accepts the statement of facts submitted by appellant as
being a correct statement.
ARGUMENT
I
THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND WAS ENFORCEABLE BY
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY.
This respondent believes and, therefore, alleges that

•]

the argument of appellant in its brief concerning this point
is a correct summary and conclusion of the law in this area
and urges that the court accept the arguments of appellant
regarding the validity of the option obtained by respondent,
Utah State Road Commission, from the respondent, Ogden City.
By way of observation, respondent would point out that
the only thing possibly lacking in its option agreement necessary to constitute a binding contract under any theory is the
amount of material to be removed.

Since, in any agreement of

this nature the amount to be removed is contingent on many
factors, including its suitability, location to the project,
future use of the property, the owners desires, etc., and
since either of the parties to the option agreement could be
adversely affected by the insertion of a definite amount of
material, it is submitted that the option should be considered
as binding, at least for the removal of a "reasonable amount."
The cost to either party or both if a complete investigation of

-2~
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the material source is made in order to define an exact figure to be inserted in an option agreement of this nature could
be an undue burden on the cost of doing business*
As to the argument that the term "reasonable amount" is
indefinite, the facts in the instant case would seem to illustrate the point that it may not be too difficult to determine
what is a "reasonable amount."

For instance, the State and

Ogden City obviously had in mind six-feet to eight-feet and
possibly up to 12-feet of depth, depending on which testimony
is considered significant.

Six-feet to eight-feet is the a-

mount Kelly represents (R-596).

Six-feet is significant in

relation to the existing option with Marquardt when the State
obtained its materials option.

Obviously, the landowner is

not going to ruin the potential of the land.

The fact they

were excavating up to 12-feet leads one to conclude that this
amount would not affect the lands potential.

Appellant's pro-

jections on the other hand, (up to 30-feet) would appear to
exceed the parameter of a "reasonable amount" since it would
presumably reduce the "after value" of the land.

Therefore,

one can assume that when the State and Ogden City negotiated
the option agreement "reasonable amount" meant something between six-feet and 12-feet of average depth.

Mr. Griffin's

estimate (Dfs Ex.No. 1) based on six-feet is 198,000 yards,
simple arithmetic makes it 396,000 yards at 12-feet of depth.
It is submitted that the court's refusal to find a binding

-3-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement against the defendant, Ogden City, for the alleged
reason that the option is not valid is unreasonable and works
an injustice on appellant and respondent, Utah State Road Commission.
In any event, Ogden City's reasons for repudiating the
contract were not based on the assertion that the option agreement was void, but were based either on the idea that they had
some hidden agreement with the Road Commission that they did
I
not have to honor the option or that they could restrict the !.
amount of material to be removed to such a small amount that
the practical effect was tantamount to no agreement.
Respondent, Road Commission, alleges that there was no
reservation express or implied that Ogden City would not have
to honor the agreement, nor does the agreement give Ogden City
the right to limit removal to such a degree that nothing could
be removed.

It is, however, asserted that a "reasonable amount"

was available for removal and this "reasonable amount" would
be between 198,000 cubic yards and 396,000 cubic yards and that
Ogden City well knew this and recognized its obligation as is
clear in the sale agreement to Robin.
Respondent, Road Commission, alleges that the court should
give meaning to the option agreement if at all possible and
alleges this can be done by finding that the parties to the
option agreement (S.R.C. & Ogden City) both understood "reasonable amount" to be something between 198,000 and 396,000 cubic

-4-
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yards and that to refine the amount to a precise figure is
unnecessary and, in fact, would be burdensome*
II
OGDEN CITY IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE OPTION
AGREEMENT WAS TOO VAGUE.
Respondent, State Road Commission, accepts and agrees
with appellants assertion regarding estoppel and its application to Ogden City in this matter.

I

As pointed out under Point I, Ogden City considered itself j.
bound to appellant and respondent, State Road Commission, as
is obvious in the sale agreement with Robin and/or Hardy Scales.
Its refusal to permit removal is a wrongful act and Ogden City
should be estopped since its agents well knew that appellant
was relying on the option when it made its bid.

If the op-

tion agreement was indeed defective, the defect was, in effect,l
cured when appellant's representative consulted with Ogden's
representative, Kimball, clothed with apparent authority, and
determined an amount of material subject to removal.
This, then, completed the last requirement necessary to
effect a binding agreement, to wit, a definite amount.

Kimball

may not have had sufficient authority to bind the city had he
executed the agreement, but his determination of an available
amount should be within his authority and thus binding, or at
least sufficient to raise an estoppel against the city now
repudiating the agreement.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Ill
OGDEN CITY BREACHED THE OPTION AGREEMENT.
The respondent, Utah State Road Commission, does not agree
with the trial court's conclusion that there was no breach of
the option agreement.
Respondent, Road Commission, agrees with the argument of
appellant as set forth in appellant's brief on this point.
It should also be pointed out that Ogden City's actions
prior to the sale to Robin and/or Hardy and as evidenced in

i

that agreement of sale reveal that they considered the option
agreement to be a binding agreement.

For instance, they in-

form appellant that they will not allow removal of material,
they reiterate this in the Weber Club meeting, (R-633, 634)
at which time they were concerned enough about their actions
to promise they would find other material, and three days
later in the sale to Robin, they recognize the rights of the
State and seek to protect themselves. (R-371)
Respondent, Road Commission, submits that at the time of
the meeting in the Weber Club, it could not have been any more
clear to the City of Ogden and its responsible governing body
(City Commission) that the option agreement would be exercised,
but for their refusal to honor the appellant's request as well
as the respondent, Road Commission, both of whom were in effect
saying, "We want the material, we'll exercise the option."
The City, on the other hand in effect is saying, "We wonrt
honor the option, but we recognize our responsibility and will

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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get you other material."

To say the option must be exercised

in writing to preserve the rights of the State and its contractor in this situation is to say the least, ridiculous.
additional notice could a writing communicate?

What

Indeed, what

good would a written notice be and what purpose would it serve?
The real question is, how do you exercise an option?

The

answer is, you communicate notice of intent to the party who
gave the option and meet the requirements set forth in the
option.

Appellant obviously gave the notice, if not to Kimball

(lack of authority?) certainly to the City Commission, City
Manager and all the world before and during the Weber Club
meeting.

The appellant and respondent, Road Commission, were

obviously prepared to meet the option terms and conditions.
It is clear that the option was "exercised" contrary to
the trial court's conclusion at some point prior to or at
least in the Weber Club meeting, and Ogden City could have
complied with the option or caused Robin and/or Hardy Scales
to comply at any time presumably.
Ogden City obviously breached the option agreement.
IV
THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE AND CONTAINED NO
RESTRICTIONS ON REMOVAL OF MATERIAL BUT THIS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY WHAT WAS REASONABLE.
Appellant argues in its brief that respondent, Road Commission, may be liable to appellant for failure to disclose
limiting conditions imposed by Ogden City upon removal of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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material or for positive misrepresentations as to the source
of materials.
Respondent, Road Commission, disputes the conclusions of
appellant and denies that the evidence shows what appellant
erroneously asserts concerning removal of material.
The option agreement contains no indication of the amount
of material available or any maximum or minimum depth of removal.

The language says removal will be to the "owners lines

and grades."

The person who seeks to exercise the option has

the burden of determining what, in fact, is available and what
conditions are.

(See language quoted in appellant's brief from

Ex. M.[StandardSpecificationsj on Pages 7 and 8 requiring notice
of intent to owner of material.)

Appellant contacted a repre-

sentative of the City, Ray Kimball, and based upon that contact
reached certain conclusions regarding availability of material.
If Mr. Kimball did not have the authority to bind Ogden City
by his statements, the respondent, Road Commission, is legally
and contractually not responsible to appellant for any erroneous
information or representations when appellant fails to notify
the right individuals or representatives of Ogden City.

In-

cidentally, respondent, Road Commission, believes and asserts
that the said Kimball had at least apparent authority to bind
Ogden City, and certainly the City was on notice of appellant's
intentions after the conversation with Kimball and their continued silence and failure to notify appellant that material
would either not be available or at least not to the extent
of their expectations as communicated to Kimball should either
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,-Rmay contain errors.

bind them by their silence or estop them from now asserting
that material was not available.
In any event, the written option contains no language
which has the effect of a limitation on removal, but anyone
seeking to exercise the option is in effect directed to Ogden
City to determine what, in fact, is available.

How can re-

spondent, Road Commission, incur liability for alleged deficiencies in the amount of material available without a
representation?

How can it be liable if it is determined

that notice was defective?

In either event, appellant was

in effect directed to Ogden City and if indeed its contact
with Ogden City was not sufficient to bind the respondent
Ogden City, it is the sole responsibility of appellant.
Notwithstanding the lack of language which would limit
removal, was there, in fact, a limitation of this nature?
The evidence would indicate that there was a discussion of
an average removal depth of six-feet.

Griffin stated, " . . .

the notes that I took at that meeting he stated that an average depth of six-feet.
feet."

(R.557)

They did not want to go below six-

He further explains possible reasons for

this limitation and other language in the option in response
to Mr. Roe's question by stating, "As Mr. Kelly explained,
that there was this option to purchase with the Marquardt
Corporation, between the Marquardt Corporation and Ogden
City, and they did not want to obligate the City to removing
this material from the entire piece of property if the Marquardt Corporation decided to exercise their option to purDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

chase, as he explained it to us." (R-561).

Counsel for the

Road Commission called Griffin back later in the trial to explain in what context the six-foot limitation was discussed
and this explanation followed:

"We were informed that al-

though Marquardt Corporation had the option with the City until approximately the 1st of April, 1966, material could be
removed from this property, and the average six-feet in depth
was discussed in relation to this present agreement between

i

Marquardt and the City of Ogden that we could remove this much
material,
QUESTION:
ANSWER:

Even if Marquardt exercised the option?
This was our understanding, yes.

QUESTION:

All right, now was anything else said about

going any deeper than that?
ANSWER:

It was not stated specifically, but we were left

with the impression that if Marquardt did not exercise the option that we possibly could obtain more material, but it would
depend on the circumstances at the time. (R-737, 738).
The Marquardt option expired a few months after the subject
option was signed and several months before the contract was
advertised for bid.

The City excavation for garbage fill was

to a depth of 12-feet.

These facts are significant when com-

pared with Griffin1s statements as well as those of Kelly.
The conclusions one gets from all the facts and statements
is that: (1) Ogden City had property with available fill material.

(2) The property was under option, to Marquardt, but

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

it was apparent the sale would not be made to Marquardt. (R600, 601)•

(3) That there was at least six-feet of average

depth of fill material available.

(4) That no exact determina-

tion of the removal depth was made by the City or the State
Road Commission.

(5) That both Ogden City and the State Road

Commission expected the successful contractor would defer to
a later determination by the City as to removal depth. ("Owners
lines and grades").

(6) That regardless of the removal depth j
i

finally decided upon, the property was strategically located

I

and its ultimate use would be considered and would be the major factor in determining removal depths, etc.

(7) That ap-

pellant based its projections as to available material on information obtained from the Assistant City Engineer and not
on information contained in the option agreement.

(8) That

whether six-feet, 12-feet or some other depth is selected as
the removal depth will vary depending on whose opinion is solicited as to a proper depth, and the projected future use of
the property.

(9) That nothing in the written option states

that the State Road Commission agreed in any way that Ogden
City would not have to honor the option agreement.
When all the foregoing facts and conclusions are viewed
objectively, it is submitted that one must conclude the option
agreement was binding on the City and obligated the City to
supply a "reasonable amount" of material and that this would
not have been less than 198,000 cubic yards (six-foot average
depth).
-11-
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It is further submitted that the weight of the evidence
does not indicate any limitation on removal except what would
be reasonable considering the expected future use of the property and that appellant must ascertain that fact from the
proper representatives of the owner.

The question of whether

they were justified in relying on the Assistant City Engineer's
representations or could assume that he would at least inform
the proper city officials is the real question, not an alleged
verbal reservation to the option by the city prior to executing the option agreement which would obviously be merged in
the written option as any first year law student knows.
As to the question of a positive misrepresentation by the
fact the plans show a total quantity available in "prospect
No. 1 which includes the property of Ogden City and the railroad, the contractor well knows, that, "The quantities appearing in the prepared bid schedule are approximate only and are
prepared for the comparison of bids.

. . . and it is under-

stood that the scheduled quantities of work to be done and
materials to be furnished may each be increased, diminished,
or omitted as hereinafter provided without in any way invalidating the unit prices bid." (Ex. M. Sec. 1-2.4) While generally they are reasonably accurate a reasonable deviation in
actual quantities as compared to estimated quantities could
deviate plus or minus ten percent.

This same rationale ap-

plies to estimates of quantities available in materials sites.
The deviation in this instance, assuming removal of twelve-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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feet and all other factors being equal would be approximately
ten percent less than projected.

It is submitted that devia-

tions are common and, in fact, are expected in the normal
course of the construction business.

Respondent, Road Commis-

sion, therefore, submits that there is no factual basis for
appellant's allegation concerning misrepresentation of available quantities of fill material.
V' '

..

'|

' •

!

DEFENDANTS ROBIN AND HARDY SCALES TORTIOUSLY INTERFERRED WITH THE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN GIBBONS AND REED
COMPANY AND OGDEN CITY.
Respondent, Utah State Road Commission, is pursuaded by
the argument of appellant with regard to this point and, therefore, asks that the court find against the respondents, Robin
and/or Hardy Scales Company.
VI
DAMAGES, IF ANY, SUFFERED BY GIBBONS AND REED WERE THE
RESULT OF THEIR OWN ACTIONS OR OF THE RESPONDENTS, OGDEN CITY;
ROBIN- AND/OR HARDY SCALES COMPANY AND ARE NOT CHARGEABLE TO
THE STATE.
It has already been pointed out in this brief that respondent, Road Commission, contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, believes the option it obtained from Ogden City to be
a valid option agreement.

Assuming that the option agreement

was valid and binding, it then follows that it must be exercised properly.

If it was not properly exercised, that is the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fault of the contractor for not contacting the proper representative of the respondent, City, or in some fashion failing
to properly notify the City of its intent.

Since an option

is a continuing offer, it is hard to understand why there would
not have been adequate notice to the City at some stage of the
proceedings.

If not in the conversation with the Assistant

City Engineer (Kimball), certainly in the meeting with the
City Council at the Weber Club.

I

There is the additional point raised by appellant regarding
repudiation of the option agreement being an excuse for failing to exercise the option.
In any event, the option agreement should have been construed as binding.

The State's responsibility or liability

should terminate once it is construed as a binding option,
except for the responsibility to protect the optionor as to
payment for material removed and other internal features in
the agreement itself.

Once the contractor informs the City

that it will exercise the option or the City informs the contractor it will not honor the option, the respondent, Road
Commission, should be relieved of any further responsibility,
except as noted.

The agreement or non-agreement becomes a

matter between the appellant and the respondent, City.
The appellant has attempted to raise the specter of a
hidden reservation in the option agreement whereby the City
would not have to honor the option unless it wanted to. This

-14-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is preposterous legally, and even more riduculous from a practical standpoint.

The respondent, Road Commission, is concerned

about providing material that is suitable and conveniently located at the best price possible, in order to minimize construction costs.
Exhibits E & F which are in evidence constitute an exchange
of letters between the respondents, Road Commission and Ogden
City relative to the availability of material from the city

;
• i

owned property.

The only reservation is the statement by

'

the City that, lf. . . we will work closely with you for the
removal of the material," and " . . . the property is under
option until next April."
The facts developed at trial, it is submitted show the
following by way of summary:
1.

The State Road Commission and Ogden City saw a mutual

benefit in removing material from the City property for use as
highway fill.
2.

The amount of material was not specified, but at least

six-feet of average depth of removal was discussed.
3.

The property was under an existing option which expired

well before any attempt was made to exercise this option.
4.

The property was sold by the City to respondent, Robin

and/or Hardy Scales Company, and the buyer knew of appellant's
intended exercise of the option.
5. A decision was reached by the respondents, Ogden City
•

•

•

'

•

»

•

•

.

-15-
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•

•

•

•

!

and/or Robin (Hardy Scales) to refuse to honor the option agreement.
6.

Ogden City considered the option to be binding as evi-

denced by its actions in referring to the "rights of the State
Road Commission" in its sale agreement to Robin, and in the
actions of the City Commissioners in the Weber Club meeting (R
633) •
7.

The only involvement by the respondent/ Road Commission,

after it obtained the option in any proceedings was as an ad- I
vocate in behalf of appellant at the Weber Club meeting.
8.

Ogden City and/or Robin intentionally refused to honor

the option agreement with full knowledge of appellants intended
exercise of the option as is obvious from the fact the sale of
the property from Ogden City to Robin occurred three days after
representatives of appellant, and the respondents, Road Commission and Ogden City met and discussed the sale and its implidations to the appellant.
Respondent, Road Commission, believes the foregoing facts
make it abundantly clear that the damages, if any, sustained
by appellant were not caused or contributed to by the respondent, Road Commission, but resulted from conscious decisions
by Ogden City and Robin (Hardy Scales) to refuse to honor the
option agreement which they obviously considered to be binding.
It is equally clear that if it is concluded in some way that
the option agreement was not properly exercised, then appellant

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is chargeable with the failure to do so pursuant to the option
agreement language as well as the Standard Specifications.
CONCLUSION
The respondent, State Road Commission, obtained an option
from respondent, Ogden City, which was a valid option.

Even tak-

ing a narrow view and viewing the option as incomplete because
it failed to define the amount of material to be removed, the
evidence shows that this defect was "cured" when appellant in I
consultation with a representative of respondent, Ogden City,
determined what amount was available.

!

The evidence further re-

veals that the respondents, Ogden City and Robin (Hardy Scales)
acted both in verbal responses and in their written agreement
as if they recognized a valid agreement existed to remove material from the property.
The respondent, State Road Commission, made no representations as to the amount of fill material available from Ogden City
and appellant's allegation concerning a secret reservation or verbal agreement with respondent, Ogden City, that it would not have
to honor the agreement with the Road Commission is not supported
by the evidence. A fair interpretation of the evidence shows
respondent, Road Commission, expected that its contractor could
remove material from the Ogden City Property, that it would at
least exceed six-feet average depth, and reasonable assumptions
based on respondent city's use of the property indicated a removal depth of up to 12-feet.

Evidence at trial clearly indicates

-17-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that if appellant was misled as to the amount of, or availability of material from Ogden City it was not the fault of
respondent, Road Commission, but is, in fact, the negligence
of appellant in failing to properly exercise the option or
if the option was properly exercised, it is then Ogden City
and/or Robin (Hardy Scales) which should respond because of
their acts.
In any event, if appellant failed to properly exercise
the option, it is in no way the fault of respondent, Road
Commission.

j

In fact, respondent, Road Commission, cannot be

liable to appellant absent a showing that the option was not
valid which it is respectfully submitted the evidence does not
disclose, and further, it is submitted that legally the option
was valid and binding under the best reasoned cases.
Respondent, Road Commission, urges that the court make
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the option agreement was a valid agreement and that
appellant either failed to properly exercise the option or that
respondents, Ogden City or Hardy Scales, or both are liable for
damages, but that in any event, respondent, Road Commission is
not liable.
Respectfully submitted,

LELAND D. FORD
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent, Road
Commission
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